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ABSTRACT
There is considerable variation in how countries deal with the pre-
sence of migrants lacking a legal right to stay. We present an analysis
of the post-arrival migration enforcement regimes of European coun-
tries using a two-phased mixed-methods approach. The article (1)
provides the currently best possible statistical overview of forced and
assisted return in 12 European countries among rejected asylum
seekers from six source countries, and (2) explores policy practices
in six Western European and Scandinavian countries regarding
deportability and eﬀective non-deportability. While most rejected
asylum seekers examined do not demonstrably return, we see highly
divergent return patterns between host countries, and signiﬁcant
policy diﬀerences. The article thus shows the importance of better
examining variation in post-arrival enforcement policies and their
underlying interests and capacities. There is not one uniﬁed ‘deporta-
tion regime’; there are at least four ideal-typical ‘post-arrival enforce-
ment regimes’: thin, thick, targeted, and hampered.
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Introduction
Scholarship on deportation studies has increased exponentially in the past decade
following the so-called ‘deportation turn’ (Gibney 2008). Traditionally considered
a secondary instrument of immigration control, liberal states increasingly take eﬀorts
to make ‘unwanted’ migrants leave their territories through forced return and Assisted
Voluntary Return (henceforth AVR or assisted return) programmes. The deportation
turn is part of a broader tendency among states to make it harder to immigrate without
a residence permit (De Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2016).
In spite of the clear tendency toward heightened post-arrival migration enforcement, there
is considerable international variation in how countries deal with the presence of migrants
lacking a legal right to stay. Even in the European Union, with its attempts to prioritise and
harmonise Member States’ return policies for irregular migrants under the 2008 Return
Directive, there seems to be considerable variation in the eﬀorts that states put in deportation
and deportation-like departure, and how they deal with issues of non-deportability, i.e. when
irregular migrants do not leave the territory and are diﬃcult to deport.
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In this article, we present the ﬁrst results of a multi-year project that is aimed at mapping
and understanding international variation in post-arrivalmigration enforcement regimes.We
ask: How do the post-arrival migration enforcement policies of diﬀerent European countries
compare to each other, what are their outcomes in terms of deportation and deportation-like
departure, and what can be said about the diﬀerent logics underlying the ways in which
deportability and non-deportability are dealt with? Is there any evidence that diﬀerent post-
arrival enforcement regimes exist?
We considerably improve previous estimates of the forced and assisted return rates of
diﬀerent (European) countries (Weber 2014; Wong 2015). Additionally, we update previous
comparative attempts to map European countries’ policies on irregular migrants and depor-
tation (Düvell 2005; Clandestino 2009), adding more information on non-deportability
measures in particular. The analysis is based on Eurostat data for 11 EU countries and
Norway for the 2013–2017 period for asylum seekers of six nationalities (Afghanistan,
Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Syria), and a qualitative exploration of six countries in
Western Europe and Scandinavia (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden).
Our academic contributions are threefold. First, our study shows the need to
examine variation in post-arrival migration enforcement policies, and how they are
used, in order to better understand the deportation turn. We ﬁnd evidence for
a ‘glocalised’ deportation turn that, much like other elements of globalisation (cf.
Hannerz 1992), takes diﬀerent forms, and has diﬀerent consequences, depending on
how it interacts with national and local contexts. That interpretation takes issue
with De Genova and Peutz (2010) notion of a uniﬁed ‘deportation regime’, a term
that is widely used in deportation studies: there are actually multiple logics at work
that cause and sustain considerable variation in policies and practices with regards
to (non-)deportability, producing variation toward not one, but at least four ideal-
typical regimes, to be described in the ﬁnal section.
Second, the analysis contributes to the discussion on the role of the state in migration
and deportation studies. Migration scholars often stress the limited eﬀects of immigra-
tion control, pointing at various ‘gaps’ between policy discourse and migration outcomes
(Czaika and De Haas 2013). Some migration scholars even argue that immigration
control is counterproductive (Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016). In deportation studies,
by contrast, there is an opposite tendency to see states as extremely powerful and
oppressive actors that are embedded in broader structures of governmentality (Bloch
and Schuster 2005; De Genova and Peutz 2010). We oﬀer a more nuanced view based on
the observation that immigration control results from a complex mix of policy interests
and diﬀerential capacities. States have considerable power, but how they want, and are
able, to deal with (non-)deportability is variable.
Third, the analysis contributes to the discussion in political science and law on
the harmonisation of asylum policies in Europe (Hatton 2015; Den Heijer, Rijpma,
and Spijkerboer 2016; Thielemann 2018). In addition to there being large diﬀerences
in recognition rates of asylum seekers across the EU despite a shared international
legal framework for refugee protection (Neumayer 2005; Leerkes 2015), we show
evidence for even larger international diﬀerences with regards to post-arrival
enforcement.
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Post-arrival migration enforcement regimes and their underlying rationales
There are two main components of immigration policy: (1) admission policy, which deﬁnes
and enforces the conditions underwhich foreignersmay legally immigrate and (2) integration
policy, which deﬁnes and enforces the rights and obligations of admitted foreigners, and
regulates how they may obtain permanent legal residence or become national citizens.
Admission policy – ‘immigration control’ – consists of (1) policies deﬁning the grounds on
which amigrant is entitled to stay in the territory, and (2) policies enforcing admission policies.
Our project is aimed at identifying diﬀerent post-arrival immigration enforcement
regimes: more or less coherent clusters of post-arrival immigration enforcement policies
that are aimed at achieving the departure of foreigners who have no legal stay in the
territory, and accommodate the presence of irregular migrants who are diﬃcult to
deport. These regimes are part of admission policy, but the approaches to non-
deportability overlap with integration policy.
A post-arrival enforcement regime is produced by interests of (non-)enforcement, which
may or may not be formally written down in laws and policy documents, and capacities of
(non-)enforcement, and both are discussed in what follows. We link our exploration to
Boswell’s (2007) overview of the core functions of the liberal state: (1) providing security,
(2) promoting economic accumulation, (3) promoting fairness by redistributing wealth in the
welfare state, and (4) performing compliance to the rule of law in order to promote institu-
tional legitimacy. Part of these functions are inherent in the institution of citizenship: social
rights require redistribution, and civil and political rights are unthinkable without a state’s
commitment to the rule of law.While Boswell positions herself against (new) institutionalism,
we propose to connect this approach to the institutional logics perspective (cf. Thornton,
Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012): states follow diﬀerent institutional logics that sometimes
complement, sometimes contradict each other, and also align, or compete with, the logics
of non-state institutions.
Interests
We consider all European states in our analysis to be liberal states, as they are based on the
principles of representative democracy, constitutionalism, nationhood and capitalist accumu-
lation (cf. Hampshire 2013). As such, the liberal state is strongly driven by the interest to
obtain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and Boswell (2007) argues that its legitimacy is
based on four structural core functions. A discussion of these shows the tensions within and
between diﬀerent interests regarding immigration enforcement, and also helps us understand
why states develop policies for groups that are diﬃcult to deport. Interest is here deﬁned in
a broad sense as something that brings advantages or is important to the state, including
certain social norms and ideas. Table 1 summarises the relationships between functions and
interests.
A ﬁrst institutional logic underlying immigration enforcement pertains to the func-
tion of the state to provide security and stability to its citizens. This relates to both
physical and symbolic security, leading to a variety of interests for immigration enforce-
ment: all European states have developed at least some infrastructure to deport foreigners
convicted of crimes and states need to deal with social disruption and security issues that
emerge from non-deportability, such as petty crime by marginalised migrants who
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cannot be deported. States also want to show concerned citizens that they are still in
control, despite their loss of inﬂuence due to globalisation, which explains highly
ritualised acts of enforcement (Wacquant 1999; Leerkes and Broeders 2010). The degree
to which immigration is seen as a threat varies between countries (Hiers, Soehl, and
Wimmer 2017).
A second logic is related to the function of the liberal state in promoting welfare and
economic growth. States want to deal with migrants in ways beneﬁting the economy,
being more welcoming to migrants, including asylum migrants (Neumayer 2005), in
times of labour shortages, while possibly being less inclined to enforce admission
requirements then, in order to not obstruct the inclusion of irregular migrants on
secondary labour markets (cf. Ambrosini 2017). When other interests are held constant,
a state’s interest to enforce irregular migrants’ departure will therefore be inversely
related to the size of its informal economy, and, relatedly, the domestic demand for
ﬂexible, unskilled labour. The informal economy is a variable: in Southern-Europe it is
larger, for example, than in Northern-Europe. The logic of accumulation may also
promote an interest in countries with a strong demand for labour migrants workers to
selectively deal with non-deportability by giving (temporary) residence permits to
employable migrants.
Third, the liberal state in general, and states with extensive welfare arrangements in
particular, will want to promote some measure of domestic fairness by guaranteeing their
citizens certain social rights, such as by setting a minimum wage, and/or by providing
social beneﬁts. The more elaborate a country’s welfare state, the stronger its interest in
limiting irregular stay, including irregular employment: irregular labour may put pres-
sure on the minimum wage and/or risks creating unemployment among citizens, who
then apply for costly unemployment beneﬁts, while irregular migrants may also apply for
costly societal services themselves that need to be paid from taxes. Social citizenship, in
Marshall’s sense, thus contributes to an interest in excluding non-citizens and enforcing
restrictive admission policies (cf. Ruhs 2013).
Fourth, the liberal state wants to be perceived as protecting human rights and be in
accordance with the rule of law, as described in the constitution and international
treaties. This means making sure that those lacking legal stay are removed, and that
coercive enforcement measures, such as detention and the use of force during deporta-
tions, are constrained by constitutional and international regulations protecting human
rights. This tension partially explains why liberal states try to prevent unwanted migrants
from reaching their territories to begin with, and why they prefer AVR, using forced
Table 1. Core functions of the liberal state and interests underlying post-arrival enforcement.
Dealing with deportability Dealing with non-deportability
Security Prioritise ‘criminals’,
appear to be ‘in control’
Control petty crime and homelessness
Economic
welfare
Prioritise non-employable irregular
migrants
Grant residence permits based on merit and/or turn a blind
eye to employed irregular migrants
Fairness/social
redistribution
Limit irregular stay including
irregular employment
Provide pathways to equal rights
Rechtstaat/Rule
of law
Limit irregular stay and prioritise
assisted over forced return
Ensure basic human rights and selectively grant residence
permits to ‘morally deserving’ migrants
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removal as a last resort. While this fourth logic will be inﬂuential in all liberal states, it
may be especially strong in countries with a strong democratic tradition.
The liberal state’s commitment to the rule of law and redistribution also explains
certain approaches to non-deportability, especially why it grants special humanitarian
permits, and sometimes carries out amnesties. It is hard for the liberal state to perma-
nently deny equal rights to individuals who have the right moral resources (cf. Lockwood
1996) and are seen as ‘deserving’ members of the society. The willingness to eventually
oﬀer such pathways to citizenship through the backdoor may be stronger in countries
where citizenship is understood in a relatively ‘civic’ (i.e. Sweden or Belgium) instead of
a more ‘ethnic’ manner (i.e. Denmark, Norway, Italy) (Koopmans et al. 2005) – or,
relatedly, where territorial ties are a necessary and suﬃcient condition for citizenship
(Vink and Bauböck 2013).
Capacities
Diﬀerent post-arrival enforcement regimes are not only the outcome of states negotiating
competing interests in context-speciﬁc ways. They are also related to what they are able to
do; their enforcement capacities. Capacities can be deﬁned as the range of available policy
instruments to obtain return and accommodate non-return, and the available opportu-
nity structures to use these instruments. Both direct and more indirect post-arrival
enforcement policies exist (cf. Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013): ‘territorial exclusion
policies’ aim to achieve departure in a direct way. These include international and
bilateral readmission agreements with origin countries to create the legal and practical
conditions for return; incentives to encourage (assisted) return, starting with fair and
humane treatment to enhance legitimacy during admission procedures and, further
down the line, an AVR infrastructure; and measures to increase forced return, such as
identiﬁcation obligations, apprehension targets, and detention facilities.
‘Social exclusion policies’, on the other hand, aim to promote departure more indir-
ectly by constraining irregular migrants’ livelihood chances: they are excluded from the
right of employment, housing, social beneﬁts, medical care, and other services. Various
Western and Northern European countries have developed systematic control mechan-
isms, which include an extensive ICT infrastructure, to verify the immigration status of
employees and clients of state and semi-state services. Such policies are meant to protect
the welfare state, but are also used to disincentivise irregular stay.
A side-eﬀect of social exclusion policies is the heightened marginalisation of irregular
migrants who are undeterred by them, leading to homelessness and petty crime among
individuals who cannot sustain themselves through paid work. As this compromises
several functions of the state mentioned above, states also develop instruments to deal
with those who cannot be deported, or tolerate poor relief measures at the municipal
level. The most common instruments of national states to deal with non-deportability are
(1) regularisation, (2) tolerated stay, and (3) encampment/detention. The use of encamp-
ment/detention still leans toward enforcement; tolerated stay and regularisation become
part of a state’s integration policies.
Next, the question is to which extent states have the capacity to implement these
measures within the existing institutional structures. For example, enforcement capacities
require an eﬀective bureaucracy and interpersonal relations that enable the collaboration
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between the diﬀerent state and non-state organisations – operating at the international,
national, local level – involved in return. This involves both the eﬀective collaboration
between diﬀerent institutions within the enforcement regime, as well as the de facto
compliance of origin states with readmission agreements. Furthermore, the capacity to
socially exclude irregular migrants will be greater in countries with well-developed welfare
arrangements, where the state penetrates relatively deeply in economic and civil life in the
ﬁelds of labour, education, health care, and social beneﬁts. A strong welfare state not only
contributes to an interest to exclude irregular migrants, it also facilitates the implementation
of that interest: in such countries, it will be relatively aﬀordable, and accepted, to add social
exclusion policies to existing regulations through institutional layering (cf. Van der Heijden
2011). Such opportunities are considerably more limited in countries with a liberal and/or
large informal economy, which include the Southern-European countries (Ambrosini
2017). The power of the rule of law and the judiciary system may similarly aﬀect interests
and capacities. Countries with a strong commitment to the rule of law will not only have
a strong interest to regulate migration within national and international legal frameworks,
they also have the strongest capacity to do so using less forced forms of return: arguably,
migrants and other relevant actors, such as immigration lawyers and the authorities of
countries of citizenship, are more likely to comply with immigration law if they perceive it
as transparent and fair (Ryo 2015; Leerkes, Van Os, and Boersema 2017).
There also is a historical component in these capacities. Countries in Western-Europe
have had positive net immigration rates for decades, and have had more opportunity to
develop capacities to deal with (non-)deportability than the Southern-European countries,
which had a negative net immigration rate until the 1990s. An immigration tradition and
a large number of established immigrants may also limit enforcement capacities, however:
more established immigrants also means more possibilities for irregular migrants to ﬁnd
support within ethnic communities, which diminishes their social exclusion and reduces
apprehension and deportation risks (Leerkes, Varsanyi, and Engbersen 2012).
Methodology
A two-phased mixed methods approach was used to explore the research questions. In
Phase 1, we aimed to provide the best possible overview of return rates and return modes
(forced or assisted return) in 12 European countries (11 EUMember States and Norway)
for six nationalities, using Eurostat data. In Phase 2, we explored policy practices to deal
with (non-)deportability of rejected asylum seekers in six selected host countries in
Western Europe and Scandinavia. The case studies were based on document analysis
and interviews and correspondence with experts – academics, government and NGO-
representatives – from the respective countries and the EU level. The countries were
selected on the basis of having a somewhat comparable GDP per capita to enable
a comparison of enforcement interests and capacities that cannot be explained by
diﬀerential ﬁnancial resources alone.
In Phase 1, we approximated return rates as follows. First, we selected groups for
which we could reasonably estimate the size of the population at risk of being required to
leave the territory. We therefore selected nationalities that mainly consist of asylum
seekers: these are registered by states whereas there are no accurate estimations of
irregular populations not seeking international protection. We selected the ten
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nationalities with the highest number of asylum seekers in EU+ countries in 2016 and
2017, excluding four nationalities (Pakistan, Albania, Nigeria, Russia) because
a signiﬁcant number of returnees to these countries are not rejected asylum seekers but
other irregular migrants, including visa overstayers. This left us with six nationalities:
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Syria.
For the host country selection, we selected all EU plus Schengen Associated Countries
(hereafter: EU+ countries) with at least 10,000 negative ﬁrst instance decisions in 2016
and 2017, excluding countries with land borders with non-EU+ countries that are
regularly crossed by persons (from the six nationalities selected) applying for asylum.1
The numerator of the return rate for nationality X from country Y is the sum of
enforced returns ‘to a third country’ in the 2013–2017 period involving individuals of
country X from country Y. For eight of the 12 EU+ countries, Eurostat speciﬁes the
number of forced and AVR (assisted) returns separately, which we used to also calculate
rates of these diﬀerent return modes. We added indicative information for the
Netherlands from a national source (see Van Houte and Leerkes 2019).
Diﬀerent operationalisations are possible of the denominator, i.e. the population at
risk of post-arrival migration enforcement. In our view, two existing international over-
views of enforcement rates operationalized the denominator too broadly as the country’s
total population or its total number of immigrants or foreign-born (Weber 2014; Wong
2015), thus also including immigrants who hardly are at risk of enforcement, including
people with family reuniﬁcation permits or EU-citizens – or had to rely on imprecise and
rather incomparable national estimates of the total irregular population (Weber 2014).
Eurostat, on the other hand, uses a, in our view, too narrow operationalisation by
counting the total number of return decisions.2 Some countries seem to be strategic in
issuing return decisions, for example by giving return decisions only when returns can
take place. These operationalisations also do not control the eﬀects of the country of
origin on a host country’s return rate.
Our main operationalisation of the denominator of the rate of nationality X leaving
from country Y is the number of negative ‘ﬁrst instance decisions’ plus the number of
‘asylum requests withdrawn’ in the 2013–2017 period, involving individuals with nation-
ality X in country Y. As a robustness check, we also present ﬁgures using a broader and
narrower operationalisation. The broader operationalisation pertains to the total number
of ﬁrst asylum requests between 2013–2017 (giving an estimate of the de facto protection
against return). The narrower operationalisation deducts the number of positive deci-
sions leading to subsidiary protection on national grounds from the negative decisions
and the asylum request withdrawn (Eurostat gives data on national subsidiary protection
for 9 of the 12 EU+ counties). Arguably, persons obtaining national subsidiary protection
are not at risk of enforcement, but it could also argued that such protection, which is
often quite precarious (e.g., needs to be renewed each year), is not independent of
enforcement interests and capacities – possibly, such protection is given because the
state cannot enforce return, or does not want to enforce it.
While our ﬁgures give a good indication of countries’ enforcement rates involving
rejected asylum seekers, there are considerable methodological limitations (for a more
thorough discussion see Van Houte and Leerkes 2019). First, the data will overestimate
rates of return to the country of origin as Eurostat only gives data on ‘returns to a third
country’, which also include returns to non-EU countries, such as Turkey under the 2016
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EU-Turkey return agreement. Second, the ﬁgures are not cohort data. This means that
the persons returning in year t are not necessarily the same people as receiving a negative
asylum decision in that year. We reduced biases this may cause by examining a relatively
long period (ﬁve years) and by comparing six countries of origin. Third, rejected asylum
seekers successfully appealing a negative ﬁrst decision are not required to leave. Fourth,
Eurostat does not include persons returning to their country of origin without any
assistance or force from European governments. However, the literature suggests that
this number will be limited, especially for nationals from relatively unsafe countries
(Leerkes, Galloway, and Kromhout 2011). Fifth, the Eurostat counts on asylum decisions
include double counts as they also pertain to decisions regarding repeated asylum
applications. Sixth, while Eurostat is dedicated to providing standardised data, several
experts have indicated that there could still be diﬀerences in how countries construct and
report data. For example, there may be diﬀerences in the operationalisation of forced and
assisted return – if only because the distinction between the two is not clear-cut in reality.
It has also been mentioned that Southern European countries do not register asylum
procedures as systematically as the more Northern countries; they may have an interest,
for example, to no register asylum applications so as to reduce Dublin claims involving
asylum seekers who have travelled to the North (but they do not appear to have such an
interest to not register returns).
All in all, the ﬁgures should be treated like proxies: the Eurostat data do not give
precise information on return rates, but can only be used to give a rough estimate of
them, so as to create a basis for international comparison.
For phase 2, we proceeded as follows: Based on Phase 1, we identiﬁed similarities and
diﬀerences in the return patterns per country, leading us to formulate a number of
guiding questions in addition to the general research questions. We then looked for
documentation (academic and ‘grey’ literature) on the focal countries and comparatively
across the EU. Next, we approached 25 focal country or comparative experts, asking them
to interpret and discuss our ﬁndings based on their expertise. Eventually, we interviewed,
or corresponded with, ten experts at the EU+ level, and country specialists on Norway,
Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium.
The explorative nature of the study so far, did not allow us to reach full saturation: the
policies of the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Germany are well-documented in
reports of the European Migration Network, but those of Norway and Denmark are not.
Information is also easier to ﬁnd on Norway than on Denmark. Moreover, the experts
were hesitant to comparatively interpret the ﬁndings, which highlights a more funda-
mental knowledge gap: little is known about why and how diﬀerent post-arrival migra-
tion enforcement regimes have emerged in comparative perspective. Throughout this
article, we indicate which elements need further investigation.
Returns to a third country from 12 EU+ countries
Figure 1 shows the estimated percentage of asylum seekers not obtaining international
protection in the 12 EU+ countries in 2013–2017 who were ‘returned to a third country’
in this period, speciﬁed for the six nationalities. Asylum seekers’ return rates vary
considerably by nationality of origin (also see Leerkes, Van Os, and Boersema 2017),
but that is not the main focus here.3 Table 2 then shows estimates of the average
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enforcement rates, which is the (unweighted) average of a host country’s rate for the six
nationalities. It also presents these averages using the broader and narrower operationa-
lisation of the denominator.
We see highly variegated patterns of return. When we use the, in our view, best
operationalisation of the population at risk, we ﬁnd average rates from 4.4% (Denmark)
to 43.8% (Netherlands). Generally, countries in Southern Europe have considerably
lower return rates than in Western and Northern Europe, a pattern that is in line with
the existing qualitative literature (Düvell 2005; Gibney 2008; King and DeBono 2013;
Collyer, Düvell, and De Haas 2012). However, we also ﬁnd considerable diﬀerences
among the six focal countries: return rates are highest in the Netherlands and Norway,
followed by Sweden and Belgium, followed by Germany and Denmark.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Afghanistan
Eritrea
Iran
Iraq
Somalia
Syria
Figure 1. Proxied return rates ‘to a third country’ from 12 EU+ countries for 6 nationalities
(2013–2017).
Table 2. Estimated average return rates ‘to a third country’ for 12 EU+ countries for 6 origin countries
(2013–2017) under three operationalisations of the population at risk.
Per person not
receiving interna-
tional protectionb Per person seeking asyluma
Per person not
receiving interna-
tional or national
protectionc
1. Netherlands 43.8% 17.6% 51.6%
2. Norway 31.4% 14.2% 37.5%
3. France 19.8% 4.0% .d
4. UK 17.8% 9.0% 19.7%
5. Austria 16.7% 4.1% 18.9%
6. Sweden 16.2% 6.9% 17.3%
7. Belgium 13.1% 7.3% . d
8. Finland 12.2% 6.1% 13.2%
9. Germany 8.4% 3.0% 9.6%
10. Italy 5.3% 0.9% 7.2%
11. Spain 4.6% 1.6% . d
12. Denmark 4.4% 3.7% 4.4%
aReturns divided by sum of ‘ﬁrst instance rejections’ and ‘applications withdrawn’.
bReturns divided by ‘ﬁrst asylum applications’.
c‘Returns divided by sum of ‘ﬁrst instance rejections’ and ‘applications withdrawn’, minus ‘decisions: humanitarian status’.
dNot available on Eurostat.
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The broader operationalisation leads to a correlated, lower range, from 0.9% (Italy) to
17.6% (Netherlands). When considering the degree of harmonisation in European
asylum policies, it is clearly not enough to only look at ‘recognition rates’: there are
large international diﬀerences in the level of de facto protection against return, i.e.
regardless of residence status acquisition. An asylum seeker not knowing his/her admis-
sion decision who is primarily interested in not being returned, is better advised to go to
Italy or Spain, or Germany or Denmark, than to Norway or the Netherlands. The
narrower operationalisation leads to a range of between 4.6% (Denmark) to 53.5%
(Netherlands), showing that the large diﬀerences in return cannot be explained by
diﬀerences in subsidiary protection on national grounds.
Figure 2 shows separate estimated rates of forced and AVR (assisted) returns for nine
EU+ countries. We see, for example, that Sweden combines a relatively high assisted rate
(13.5%) with a relatively low forced return rate (2.8%). Denmark, by contrast, combines
a comparable forced return rate (3.7%) with a nearly non-existing assisted return rate
(0.7%). Norway and the Netherlands both have a relatively high forced and assisted return
rate. Interestingly, no EU+ country combines a high forced return rate with a low assisted
return rate.
As the distinction between forced and assisted return is blurred in reality, there is
a possibility that these ﬁgures also reﬂect eﬀorts by states to classify returns in accordance
with their oﬃcial policies: some states may try to be perceived as minimizing state
violence, whereas other states may try to downplay their dependence on migrants’
compliance. Without further evidence, however, we take these ﬁgures as indicating
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the mode of returns on top of the rates of return.
Figure 2. Estimated rates of AVR and forced return to a third country for nine EU+ countries.
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Next to all the diﬀerences, we observe one important regularity: even in host countries
with the highest return rates, the majority of the migrants not obtaining international
protection do not demonstrably leave the territory, a ﬁnding that conﬁrms existing
research (Koser and Kuschminder 2015; Leerkes, Van Os, and Boersema 2017). We
interpret these patterns in the next section, focusing on the six focal countries.
Dealing with (non-)deportability: toward a typology
In Phase 2, we mapped the focal countries’ infrastructure regarding territorial exclusion
(return agreements, apprehension and detention infrastructure, AVR policies), social
exclusion (exclusion from services and regular life chances) and ‘non-return’ policies
(amnesties, humanitarian permits on special grounds, accommodation and encampment
policies), summarised in Table 3, and further discussed below (for a more detailed
discussion see Van Houte and Leerkes 2019).
On paper, we see strongly converging policy approaches: all focal countries have an
infrastructure for both forced return and assisted return, use social exclusion measures,
and have policies to accommodate non-return. The apparent convergence indicates that
liberal states do follow comparable logics to some extent.
A closer look nonetheless reveals notable diﬀerences. We ﬁnd the enforcement infra-
structure to be somewhat more developed in the Netherlands and Norway, followed by
Sweden and Germany, followed by Belgium and Denmark. Additionally, we ﬁnd indica-
tions for variation in how countries use their capacities, which we interpret as reﬂecting
diﬀerences in enforcement interest: relatively strong in the Netherlands, Norway,
Denmark and Belgium, and somewhat weaker in Sweden and Germany. The combina-
tion of capacities and interests also shows in the diﬀerential return rates of these countries
reported in the above.
All in all, our analysis suggest that it is useful to analytically distinguish four ideal-
typical regimes, based on diﬀerent positions with regard to enforcement capacity and
enforcement interest (see Figure 3): thick, targeted, hampered and thin. Below we discuss
these ideal-typical regimes in more detail, illustrating each type with two countries, while
fully acknowledging that none of the countries are perfect examples of the pure types.
Table 3. Overview of return and non-return policies.
Territorial exclusion
Social
exclusion
Non-
return Non-return policies
Forced
returns
Assisted
Returns
NL ++ ++ ++ + Amnesties; special humanitarian permits; basic shelter and
food provisions.
NO ++ ++ ++ +- Indeﬁnite access to reception centres
SE + ++ ++ ++ Amnesties; special humanitarian permits; non-enforcement
policies, track switching
DE + + ++ ++ Special humanitarian permits, non-enforcement policies, track
switching
BE +- + +- + Amnesties; special humanitarian permits, bed-bad-bread
centres for families
DK ++ +- ++ +- Indeﬁnite compulsory stay in ‘departure centres’.
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Thick enforcement regimes
The Netherlands and Norway tend toward the ‘thick enforcement regime’, which com-
bines strong enforcement interests with extensive enforcement capacities. The thick regime
has an interest to return as many irregular migrants as possible and has a relatively strong
infrastructure to do so. Both Norway and the Netherlands combine instruments to obtain
forced return – detention facilities, identiﬁcation measures and personnel, but also com-
prehensive diplomatic and interpersonal relations with origin and transit countries – with
generous regulations for AVR, communicated through motivational counselling. Both
countries also have comprehensive regulations, which include extensive ICT infrastruc-
tures, to socially exclude unauthorised migrants from formal labour markets, social
beneﬁts, education and health care. The combination of ‘hard’ policy (force, social exclu-
sion) with ‘softer’ interventions (seeking to obtain migrants’ trust, diplomacy) seems to
result in relatively high levels of assisted and forced return.
Several experts emphasise that eﬀective return policies are not only about inﬂuencing
migrants’ decision-making processes; they also stand or fall with bilateral agreements
with the country of origin, embedded in good international relations. Especially the high
forced return rates of Norway are argued to be related to its investment in comprehensive
diplomatic and interpersonal relations, where, next to a formal agreement, immigration
police oﬃcers are stationed in origin countries to make arrangements for individual
cases. Also, both countries are said to have an eﬀective, centralised bureaucracy, with
a clear central coordination of return. For example, the Netherlands saw its return rates
increase with the arrival of a designated Return and Repatriation Service (DT&V) in
2007, which coordinates the return process and chairs local return consultations with
relevant stakeholders (cf. Leerkes, Van Os, and Boersema 2017). Although AVR pro-
grammes alone do not convince people to return, money does seem to matter: Increases
in ﬁnancial assistance in the Netherlands seemed to have increased AVR rates, although
they may also lead to some degree of substitution from unassisted to assisted return, and
attract irregular migration from relatively nearby countries (Leerkes, Van Os, and
Boersema 2017).
Figure 3. A typology of post-arrival immigration enforcement regimes.
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Within these ‘thick’ enforcement regimes, the speciﬁcs of the diﬀerent measures seem
to be less relevant. While the Netherlands makes full use of the maximum 18-month
detention period set by the Return Directive, Norway makes rather limited use of
detention in spite of an equally long legal maximum. Norway nonetheless allows surprise
raids and assigns arrest quota to the police force, which is known for its stoicism in
aiming for these targets. In the Netherlands, too, various centre-right cabinets tried to set
similar quota, but these were always met resistance by police – which traditionally fall
under the responsibility of local mayors – especially when police were being required to
apprehend migrants who do not cause public order concerns (Leerkes, Varsanyi, and
Engbersen 2012).
Such a comprehensive package of return measures is expensive – especially the costs of
identiﬁcation, travel documents, diplomatic relations, detention, police, and charter ﬂights.
Thick enforcement regimes donot only have the resources to spend these budgets, but are also
willing to spend them, being relatively unselective as to the range of irregularmigrants that the
national government tries to target.
Our experts indicate that high enforcement interests partially stem from welfare state
logics. It is claimed that the Nordic countries until recently were relatively culturally
homogenous societies built on solidarity and a large welfare state, which supposedly led
to forms of ‘welfare nationalism’ (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012), granting more priority
to excluding ‘those who are not members of these close-knit democracies’ (Weber 2014;
Barker 2013; Ugelvik and Ugelvik 2013). The Netherlands has earlier experience with
immigration-related diversity and began investing in return policies since the late 1980s,
claiming it was necessary to protect the welfare state. Later, centre-right governments
increasingly began using security-related and law-and-order arguments, arguing that
enforcement of negative admission decisions would deter future irregular migration and,
in more progressive readings, help to maintain popular support for legal migration.
The tendency of thick regimes to exclude irregular migrants from livelihood opportu-
nities unintendedly produces conditions that compromise public security, such as petty
crime and homelessness, and raise humanitarian concern among part of the population.
For this reason, the thick enforcement regime paradoxically contributes to a need to
provide basic relief and accommodation in order to mitigate issues of public security and
unrest. Indeed, in both Norway and theNetherlands we ﬁnd poorhouse-like institutions for
irregular migrants who are diﬃcult to deport with basic accommodation, food and living
allowance provided below the level for citizens, without access to employment, beneﬁts or
education (Leerkes 2016; Suárez-Krabbe, Arce, and Lindberg 2018). In addition to keeping
people oﬀ the streets, it is also hoped that the basic provisions will encourage migrants'
willingness and readiness to leave, and/or to make sure that people can easily be traced
whenever forced return becomes possible.
There is little support for collective regularisation programmes in Norway in parti-
cular (UDI 2011; Brick 2011). The Netherlands has had a few regularisation pro-
grammes – preceded by years of political discussion – targeting speciﬁc migrant
categories for a limited amount of time. Regularisations based on individual cases at
the discretion of a minister or state secretary do not happen in Norway, and in May 2019,
the Netherlands decided to remove the discretionary power from the state secretary.4 The
Netherlands does have other individual-level regularisation mechanisms, in which
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legalisation is partially earned (e.g. for minors who have been in the country for more
than ﬁve years and are believed to have cooperated suﬃciently with return).
Targeted enforcement regimes
The ‘targeted regime’ has a relatively strong enforcement capacity, which is used in
a more selective manner. Both Germany and Sweden tend in that direction. Their
capacities to enforce returns are comparable to those of the Netherlands and Norway.
Sweden’s capacity to realise assisted returns even stands out: while all countries adhere to
the requirements of the Return Directive for a fair and transparent procedure for
decisions on the return of irregular migrants, and a minimum set of rights pending
their removal, Sweden has made this a priority. Sweden’s focus on human rights and
legitimacy, along with generous AVR packages, seems to result in high assisted return
rates (Figure 2) (DeBono, Ronnqvist, and Magnusson 2015; Weber et al. 2019). The low
rate of forced return implies that it is not primarily the threat of forced return that
pressures migrants into accepting assisted return in Sweden.
What is speciﬁc about the targeted enforcement regime is that certain categories of
migrants are deliberately exempted from enforcement through track switching and formal
toleration policies. In Sweden, rejected asylum seekers may under certain conditions be
given a year to seek regular employment. If they ﬁnd it, they will receive a non-asylum
residence permit. Germany is known for its Duldung system, under which non-deportable
rejected asylum seekers are oﬃcially tolerated and receive accommodation, basic health care
and, depending strongly on local arrangements, may be entitled to living allowances,
employment, and education. Furthermore, those with Duldung status may in speciﬁc
cases apply for a residence permit after one year on grounds of being ‘well-integrated’.
These regulations are permanent and therefore diﬀerent from the more ad hoc regularisa-
tion programmes targeting speciﬁc migrant categories for a limited amount of time,
although these have also occurred in both countries (Brick 2011).
In Sweden, the more targeted use of migration enforcement, and the stronger empha-
sis on perceived legitimacy, is associated with a tendency to give street-level bureaucrats
a considerable measure of discretion when implementing enforcement. For example,
Hansson (2017) argues that police oﬃcers responsible for the return of unaccompanied
minors need discretionary space as a coping mechanism and have to combine eﬃciency
and dignity (also see DeBono, Ronnqvist, and Magnusson 2015). This is clearly
a diﬀerent approach to immigration enforcement from that in Norway with its top-
down apprehension targets. The Swedish case in particular also shows that welfare state
logics, though important, do not fully explain enforcement regimes. Like Norway,
Sweden is a universal welfare state, but it is far less ‘universal’ in its enforcement, and
less inclined to use force.
While labour market needs and economic interests seem to drive the post-arrival
enforcement regime in a more targeted direction, there seem to be additional logics at
work in Sweden and Germany. Interestingly, both Sweden and Germany have a more
limited (per capita) involvement in international military interventions compared to
countries like Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, especially when they are expected
to use violence.5 Future research could examine if a cultural-historically formed reluctance
to use state violence in liberal states like Sweden and Germany, which expresses itself in
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policies of neutrality or non-intervention, also manifests itself in a reluctance to use force in
immigration control, thus taking the enforcement regime in a targeted direction.
Hampered enforcement regimes
Both Belgium and Denmark tend toward the ‘hampered regime’; here, a strong
enforcement interest coincides with weaker enforcement capacities. In Belgium, the
degree of state penetration in economic and civil life is lower than in the other focal
countries, as indicated by a larger informal economy and larger private housing
market (cf. Van Meeteren 2010) hampering the implementation of social exclusion
policies. The bureaucratic apparatus also seems to be less eﬀective: Belgian experts
hypothesise that the complex and overall polemic governmental landscape in Belgium
contributes to a reluctance among local law enforcers to comply with federal enforce-
ment policies.
Denmark has a strong welfare state with ample opportunities to socially exclude
irregular migrants and also takes a strict approach by requiring rejected asylum seekers
to stay in ‘departure centres’ and by using long maximum detention periods. However, it
lacks a well-developed AVR infrastructure, with stricter conditions for AVR than in the
other countries and less ﬁnancial compensation. We hypothesise that the Danish govern-
ment’s anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric, which may partially be aimed at
warding oﬀ the competition by populist anti-immigration parties, hampers the develop-
ment of positive return incentives. Both the rhetoric and the lack of positive incentives,
however, reduce the legitimacy of immigration law in the eyes of migrants and/or
authorities in countries of origin and transit, which may contribute to a reluctance of
both to comply with return. Levels of institutional trust are relatively low among
migrants in Denmark, especially for the ﬁrst generation (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010).
Hampered regimes seem to struggle with non-return and large numbers of irregular
migrants residing in the country in legal limbo. In Denmark, non-deportable migrants
are 'tolerated' in the remote ‘departure centres’, and there were plans to isolate unwanted
migrants with criminal records on Lindholm island, until these plans were cancelled by
the newly elected government in 2019. Belgium seems to resort mostly to delaying
enforcement by issuing temporary humanitarian visas and seems to be grudgingly
accepting informal absorption at relatively high levels (cf. Van Meeteren 2010). In the
meantime, the issue of return is the subject of heated political debate and polarisation.
Both countries did use regularisation programmes in the past (Brick 2011).
Thin enforcement regimes
In the ‘thin enforcement regime’ there is limited interest and capacity to enforce admis-
sion requirements. Based on the quantitative ﬁndings and the available literature, Spain
and Italy would traditionally fall into this category (cf. Düvell 2005), although we did not
investigate these countries in-depth. Both Spain and Italy can be expected to have both
a relatively weak enforcement interest and capacity, given the dependence on migrant
labour in the informal sector, which makes it not only undesired but also more diﬃcult to
institutionally exclude irregular migrants through formal requirements to employers to
check employees’ immigration status. Spain and Italy can also be expected to have more
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limited enforcement capacities because of a lower GDP per capita. While the focal
countries consider regularisations as incidental, the largest and most frequent regularisa-
tions have taken place in Italy and Spain (Brick 2011).
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we compared 12 EU+ countries, of which six in more detail, and six main
asylum seeker nationalities in order to identify the post-arrival migration enforcement and
non-enforcement policies of diﬀerent liberal states, and to explore the diﬀerent logics
underlying diﬀerent approaches to (non-)deportability. The preliminary ﬁndings corrobo-
rate the main assumption underlying our project; there is not a uniﬁed deportation regime.
Instead, countries tend towards diﬀerent ideal-typical post-arrival migration enforcement
regimes. Furthermore, we show that a state’s approach to deportability should not be
studied in isolation from its approach to non-deportability. To some extent, return and
non-return policies have similar underlying logics and they are also likely to inﬂuence each
other: for example, policies of social exclusion as an enforcement instrument paradoxically
contribute to an interest to provide basic accommodation to irregular migrants who cannot
support themselves. There is an additional reason for paying attention to non-return
policies in deportation studies: a considerable number of irregular migrants are not
demonstrably returned, even in countries with the highest return rates.
The analysis suggests that governmental approaches to (non-)deportability in Europe tend
toward at least four ideal-typical regimes, which result from diﬀerent positions on two
underlying dimensions, namely enforcement interest and enforcement capacity: ‘thick enfor-
cement regimes’ combine a strong enforcement interest with an extensive enforcement
capacity; ‘targeted enforcement regimes’ have a relatively strong enforcement capacity,
which is used in a more targeted manner; for ‘hampered regimes’, a strong enforcement
interest coincideswith limited enforcement capacities. A fourth regime typewould be the ‘thin
enforcement regime’ where there is limited interest and capacity to enforce.
There is suggestive evidence that the existing variation in post-arrival enforcement
partially results from the various logics of the liberal state having diﬀerent strengths in
diﬀerent contexts. All liberal states have some interests in common, which are related to the
four core domains on which they obtain their legitimacy – security, economic welfare,
domestic fairness (redistribution), and the rule of law. But to some extent, they also have
speciﬁc interests and capacities. In our view, ‘the’ deportation regime as described by De
Genova and Peutz (2010) actually qualiﬁes as a targeted regime, as it mostly enforces
deportation whenmigrants become unproductive or commit crimes.6 In Europe, we clearly
also see other varieties of post-arrival enforcement due to the stronger inﬂuence of the logic
of fairness in relation to the welfare state and diﬀerent concerns regarding institutional
legitimacy. This variation, which is already observed for the six focal countries – and, more
indirectly, for the 12 EU+ countries – suggests a ‘glocalised’ deportation turn: while there is
a global trend toward more post-arrival enforcement, context-speciﬁc domestic factors
produce and sustain a signiﬁcant variation.
Diﬀering national orientations to the institution and conceptualisation of citizenship
may partly underlie the international similarities and diﬀerences in (non-)enforcement, but
our analysis shows that they have only limited explanatory power. Certainly, states give
nationals privileged access to social, civic and political rights, which contributes to certain
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interests – and speciﬁc capacities – to exclude non-citizens by enforcing negative admission
decisions, and liberal states in particular also have an interest to limit the use of force.
Arguably, the tendency of liberal states to understand citizenship as something that can
change – the right to change one’s nationality is mentioned in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights – also puts pressure on these states to develop non-return policies by
eventually oﬀering pathways to citizenship to certain categories of ‘deserving’ irregular
migrants, such as long-staying minors. It would be too easy, however, to solely attribute
variation in (non-)enforcement to citizenship. The three social-democratic Nordic welfare
states, with similar understandings of social citizenship, tend towards three diﬀerent
enforcement types, and Koopmans' et al. (2005) ideal-typical citizenship regimes also do
not neatly coincide with (non-)enforcement policies. Denmark and Norway have a more
ethnic orientation to citizenship (e.g. requiring 7 to 9 years of legal stay before naturalisa-
tion becomes possible) and are indeed relatively reluctant to provide pathways to citizen-
ship to irregular migrants, mostly keeping non-deportable migrants in reception centres
instead. But Germany, with a comparable orientation to citizenship, is considerably more
willing to provide such pathways to (economically) integrated, non-deportable irregular
migrants. Sweden is among the European countries with the most civic and inclusive
understanding of citizenship and is indeed relatively willing to oﬀer citizenship to certain
segments of the irregular population. Belgium, by contrast, which has a more or less similar
orientation to citizenship as Sweden (cf. Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Vink and Bauböck
2013), is not, or not as much.
Our comparative exploration still only scratches the surface of a highly complex issue.
Future work could develop the preliminary typology oﬀered here and delve deeper in the
causes of international similarities and diﬀerences in states’ interests and capacities
regarding (non-)deportability. Truly and comparatively understanding the political
conﬂicts, public support and controversy around immigration enforcement would also
require more in-depth comparative-historical studies of state institutions and how they
interact with non-state institutions in the ‘interinstitutional system’ (Thornton, Ocasio,
and Lounsbury 2012), and of the activities of various political entrepreneurs that partially
construct state interests, capacities and functions. With that view, more historical-
comparative research is also needed on receiving states with diﬀerent political systems
and diﬀerent migration histories, including in the Global South.
Notes
1. We also decided to include Denmark (7,830 negative decisions).
2. See for example: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics explained/index.php/
Enforcement_of_immigration_legislation_statistics. Visited December 2019.
3. The high return rate for Afghans in France may point at a peak in rejected asylum claims by
Afghans before the selected period and/or the termination of residence permits previously
issued to Afghans in France. It may also be related to the strong presence of the French army
in Afghanistan in 2013–2017.
4. https://ind.nl/nieuws/Paginas/Discretionaire-bevoegdheid-per-1-mei-afgeschaft.aspx.
5. See for example: https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/sep/21/afghanistan-
troop-numbers-nato-data#data.
6. Traditionally, the ‘neo-liberal’ migration enforcement regime of the US was primarily
driven by employer interests. Possibly, since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001,
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there has been a stronger inﬂuence of security logics, which has led the federal government
to try to show that it is able to ‘stop’ irregular migration.
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